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As cities become more involved in data-driven processes of growth and governance, critical
scholarship has highlighted the formidable issues around ownership, uses and the ethics of
collecting,  storing,  and circulating such data.  However,  there has been less focus  on the
physical infrastructure as the ‘last mile’ problem for Internet access, between a revanchist
perspective on the ‘broken Internet’ delivered by digital capitalism and the liberal rhetoric of
the  Internet  as  a  human  right.  Through  two  case  studies,  the  paper  plots  a  pragmatic
trajectory in the adoption of the Internet for people and ‘things’, in which city and users take
different roles and responsibilities. It highlights benefits and challenges around the long-term
sustainability  and  maintenance  of  the  Internet  as  an  infrastructure  of  the  commons.  An
attention to ‘commoning’, instead, reveals the exclusionary or enabling practices the smart
city might foster.  Thus, the paper advocates for  the direct involvement  of  the city  and its
citizens in maintaining and reproducing connectivity networks in the smart city. 
Smart City; Public Internet; Commons; Commoning; Wi-Fi networks
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Introduction
‘Smart city’ has become such a loaded concept in policy discourses, academic papers, and
industry reports, that it is difficult to provide an agreed definition. Some scholars highlight
technological  innovations  (interconnected  sensors,  devices,  servers,  and  algorithms  for
automated responses and data collection)  and the opportunities such technologies  offer as
spatialised  or  collective  intelligence,  in  terms  of  mobility  and communication  (e.g.,  Foth
2017; Picon 2015). Others, the new forms of governmentality these innovations produce by
data streams which feed dynamically into management systems (Luque-Ayala and Marvin
2016; Sadowski and Pasquale 2015; Vanolo 2014). Kitchin (2014, 2016) puts emphasis on the
epistemological underpinnings that relate urbanism to software-led sciences, contending that
the current mode of production of smart cities is data-driven and this has become instrumental
to the technocratic  approach to urban issues.  While some authors would favour a citizen-
centric  model that  fosters social  innovation,  civic  engagement  and transparent governance
(e.g., Bria 2017; de Lange and de Waal 2013; Townsend 2013), for Hollands (2008) smart
cities represent a technology-led stage in the process of neoliberalisation and gentrification of
cities: a “high-tech variation of urban entrepreneurialism” (p. 305) that seeks to attract the
creative class and evades notions of social justice. 
Clearly, ‘one size fits all’ is not a feasible path in the smart city discourse. Shelton, Zook
and Wiig (2015) warn about the complexity and diversity of the ways in which the smart city
idea(l) is implemented: “smart city interventions are always the outcomes of existing social
and spatial constellations of urban governance and the built environment” (p. 14). The paper
attends to this call by showing a variety in the ‘last mile’ Internet provision, highlighting their
long-term  sustainability  issues  –  I  frame  these  in  a  debate  around  ‘commoning’  and
maintenance  of  the  commons.  Although  smart  cities  are  not  just  about  broadband
connectivity, access to unlimited, super-fast and possibly free Internet has been symbolically
crucial to the making of smart cities: the Internet is thought to be the smart city backbone,
“the backbone of  modern society,  a  platform for businesses,  governments  and citizens  to
exchange news and views, as well as to provide services, whether essential or trivial” (The
Digital Agenda for Europe).i However, private and communitarian actors often gloss over the
fact that the Internet as infrastructure is a form of ‘public value’ embedded in a longer term
strategy  of  technological  and  infrastructural  innovation  (Mazzucato  2018).  Even  in  the
scholarly  community,  the  Internet  backbone  is  often  related  to  research  papers  from  an
engineering background, which generally discuss network protocols, resilience, and security,
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but  not  social  ecologies  and  political  issues  around  its  deployment.  Between  a  sort  of
revanchism around the ‘broken Internet’ of digital capitalism and the liberal rhetoric of the
Internet  as  a  human  right,  only  recently  media  studies  have  gone  through  the  so-called
‘infrastructural turn’ with the aim of focusing on “scale, industry logics, and policy” in the
everyday uses of digital platforms, on the “various material assemblages” that make them, and
on  “the  business  of  Internet  service  provision”  such  platforms  attend  to  (Plantin  and
Punathambekar  2018).  Instead,  this  paper  takes  a  pragmatic  and  empirical  approach
considering different ecologies of implementation, control, and maintenance of the Internet as
smart city  infrastructure,  beyond the present  neoliberal  landscape of privatised and quasi-
monopolistic provision.
The ‘smart’ in the smart city
One effective way to grasp the diversity of smart city initiatives, and their pervasiveness in
every  aspect  of  daily  life,  is  by  following  Kitchin  (2016)  who  lists  these  through  their
different domains: from the very functioning of city governance and security to the intimate
spaces of home and the body, sensors and related software for extraction, transmission, and
eventual  analysis  of  data  are  implemented  and  used  by  a  vast  number  of  city  dwellers,
organisations, service providers, critical infrastructures, and city executives. This incredible
variety of smart city solutions presents also some rather consistent characteristics, which I try
to group in the following three points.
First, smart technologies are always somehow linked to an algorithm-led response, even
only  for  a  card  payment  or  for  an  instance  of  communication.  Ultimately,  algorithmic
functions  represent  the  ‘smart’  bit  in  smart  technology.  They  involve  always some
transmission of information or data from one agent (machinic, human-operated, or human) to
another. Recording, storing or transmission are the  modus operandi  of smart technologies,
their  reasons  to  be.  Therefore,  while  traditionally  the  Internet  has  facilitated  interaction
between  humans,  the  current  socio-technological  landscape  starts  being  dominated  by
different configurations we can group under the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT). These ‘things’ are
digital devices that typically have a communication interface, processing and storage units,
and sensors for detection of environmental changes or for service provision to other clients.
The combination of short-range mesh networks and the wider cellular network can provide
wireless connectivity to these ‘things’ in order to exchange data to the wider Internet. While
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transmission between people and machines favours a degree of communication that would be
otherwise impossible (typically in ‘Voice Over IP’ calls across the globe), on a deeper level
exchange happens in milliseconds between algorithms that regulate many other aspects of
daily life, such as financial interfaces and banking transactions, or IoT devices at home and in
the urban environment.
Second, and consequently, this variety of smart technologies are in desperate need of some
form of connectivity or infrastructural support for data exchange. The smart city paradigm is
based on the notion of connectivity among heterogeneous smart city objects via networks that
use short-range communication technologies and, eventually, Internet gateways. In the future
smart  city,  providing  flawless  connectivity  will  probably  become a  real  challenge  as  the
density of connected devices that have multi-radio capabilities increases. Thus, the battle for
speed  and  reliability  of  Internet  connectivity  has  become  a  synonymous  of  city  growth,
competitivity  and  progress:  a  brand,  like  in  the  case  study  of  Chattanooga  city,  below.
Inequality of access (for people and ‘things’) is indeed a striking paradox at the heart of the
smart city: how can this super connected and increasingly complex urban environment work
without a strong backbone and its capillary distribution to as many users / customers / citizens
/ ‘things’ as possible? The booming IoT risks increasing the exclusivity gap (super connected
areas or hubs) and splintering service provision further, as observed by pioneering studies on
digital cities (Graham & Marvin, 2001).  
Third, a major obstacle for the adoption of smart technologies seems to be exactly this
scarcity, which capitalism is so good at creating via market imperatives of privatization and
efficiency:  Fibre-to-Home,  for  instance,  is  almost  everywhere  in  the  hands  of  Big  Cable
which  hold  often  a  quasi-monopolist  position.  Giant  providers  control  Internet  provision
acting as gateway for people and ‘things’, metering and throttling connectivity at a high price
and slowing down at will. A splintered network is probably more difficult to regulate and
develop: for instance, Korea’s resistance to early privatization allowed high levels of public
investment in broadband infrastructure (Curran 2018). Whatever the means of delivering it to
the overall population, for some, the Internet has to be considered a critical infrastructure like
water or heath (one of the rights that  makes the ‘right to the smart city’  operative,  so to
speak): “connecting communities to the web is the pathway, not the end goal, for true equity
and empowerment” (Mabud and Seitz-Brown 2017). 
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The variety and pervasiveness of smart technologies in the everyday life of cities raise,
however, a formidable array of ethical issues in relation to extraction and treatment of data,
surveillance and control, as well as privacy, consent and disclosure of personal and sometimes
sensitive data for any purpose. Technology critic Evgeny Morozov calls it “data extractivism”
(2015; see also Mezzadra and Neilson 2017), others “data colonialism” (Thatcher, O’Sullivan,
and Mahmoudi 2016) or “platform capitalism” (e.g., Shaw and Graham 2017). They all point
to the extraordinary concentration of data produced through uses, consumption, and leisure –
that is,  through life itself  – in the hands of a few Silicon Valley’s start-ups.  Participation
through the workings of smart technologies can thus come to the price of reduced privacy,
nudging advices and more severe breaches of collective rights, such as mass surveillance.
Neither, more Internet access equates to more freedom. As Couldry (2018) puts it, “While the
Internet is often credited with bringing freedom, its most important feature is connection, not
freedom”. And such ‘connection’  is not neutral.  For instance,  in their  study of Facebook,
Skeggs  and  Yuill  (2018)  argue  the  social  media  frenzy  has  masked  the  neoliberalisation
process  of  subjectivity,  the  online  performance  of  the  self  measured  via  metrics  of
appreciations,  participation,  and  value  exchange.  While  many  reports  insist  that  more
megabits  per  second boost  the  economy,ii the  industry  has  appropriated  the  liberal  rights
discourse of Internet  access as a human right claim – famously, Facebook wanted to launch
‘Free Basics’ in India in 2015 and operate an off-line text-only policy, ‘Facebook Zero’, for
non smart phone users in Myanmar (see Plantin and Punathambekar 2018). Every city has a
different  story to  tell,  but  when Facebook agrees  with telephonic  companies  for  free but
locked-in access, while the cost of going private takes a substantial part of a family income, it
comes with no surprise that most people think that “Facebook is the Internet”.iii With platform
capitalism becoming infrastructures, there is a poignant question to be asked: in a nutshell,
would the Internet be only a gateway to train a wider reserve army of digital workers? 
The paper does not attempt to answer this question. However, the two case studies below
suggest a pragmatic approach, showing different ecologies of implementation, control, and
maintenance of the network which delivers the Internet. In the present scenario of a growing
demand for connectivity from people to ‘things’, it is easy to believe that the capacity of the
networks will be increased and expanded. We can move the above question to the supply side
and ask:  how  and in  whose  terms is  this infrastructural development going to happen? To
repeat, the issue of public availability and fair access to the Internet is not going to challenge
the many faces of digital capitalism, but it might provide  one possible gateway in the life
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cycle of data for more local control and accountability. At very least, the paper suggests to
revert the vicious circle of privatisation of infrastructures and the consequent centralisation of
the Internet in the hands of very few and powerful companies – this is particularly acute in the
US for a series of historical reasons (Hu 2015). Beyond the neoliberal rhetoric of the ‘market
failure’,  public  resources  and  skills  could  be  turned  towards  more  fair  and  open
infrastructures, by  bolstering different approaches to commoning – the contested process of
delivering, protecting and maintaining the infrastructure as a commons, to which I turn next. 
Commons and commoning in the smart city
A useful line of thought in the vast literature on commons suggests that this concerns not so
much the conflict between public and private (e.g., De Angelis 2001; Stavrides 2016). Rather,
commons manifests itself, historically, as the locus within which peoples’ social reproduction
is put into practice. The confusion is exactly at the point of departure from the idea of the
commons  that  emerges,  in  medieval  England,  as  a  fight  against  the  enclosures  of  land.
According to Illich (1982), people saw this common space not as a “non-private space”, rather
as the space where their everyday subsistence was guaranteed. Using the commons was an act
of temporary appropriation, an everyday practice for the purpose of social reproduction: thus,
a commons is determined not so much by its proprietary regime, but by the uses and practices
around it. A common good, in other words, has no ontological substance in itself. It becomes
a commons because of the qualitative relationship with one or more subjects; it is the use
value,  of a place or an object,  that makes it relevant  to the commons: “you don’t have a
common good, you share in common good” (Mattei cited in Iaione 2012). For McLaren and
Agyeman  (2015),  “sharing  and  cooperation  are  universal  values  and  behaviours”  and,
therefore, “sharing is an opportunity to release [people’s cooperative] capacity, confined by
competitive markets and bureaucratic states” (p. 24). So, if cities are shared creations with
shared public services, streets, mass transit, and shared spaces, “truly smart cities must also be
sharing cities” (ibidem).
Some scholars therefore prefer to put the emphasis on ‘commoning’,  a set of practices
which both “actively seek[s] to integrate resources from the state and capital into commons
circuits”  (Birkinbine  2018),  and  reproduces  the  commons  through  sharing  resources  in
solidarity networks. The latter shifts our focus on the long-term maintenance of the commons:
“the true challenge  of the commons”,  according to  Huron (2015:973). De Angelis  (2017)
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argues that this hinges around the daily practices of the community of interest involved, and
around  the  bundle  of  rights  attached  and  their  enforcement,  which  should  protect  the
commons and guarantee its reproduction. Thus, commoning highlights the contested, open-
ended, and political character of urban commons (De Angelis and Stavrides 2010). In this
sense,  commoning  is  a  “grass-roots  project  to  build  a  new  form of  consensus  around  a
different set of values and ethical codes” (Susser 2017:1). But, what does this mean nowadays
when most people's livelihood, especially in the Global North, might depend on access to
information, communication and coding (Lash 2002)? What is commons and what the value
of commoning in a city increasingly regulated by processes of data acquisition and exchange?
For Hardt and Negri (2009), the results of advanced capitalist production are expressed as
a ‘collective intelligence’ unlocked by the forced multiplicity and proximity that urban living
implies. Value is created now by life itself, in mundane and very material practices of urban
dwelling,  social  encounters,  and social  reproduction.  Production  extends to  the city  in its
totality: it is the social factory 4.0. Thus, many activists and scholars advocate for ‘digital
commons’,  where  ownership  and  control  of  data  become  democratic  practices  of
appropriation of technology. For instance, the ‘right to the digital city’ (de Lange and de Waal
2013) is centred on an alternative form of ownership of data, and the ‘informational right to
the city’ (Shaw and Graham 2017) is grounded in a “sense of belonging to a collective place
… and [a] willingness to share a private resource with the collective”. At least, citizens should
have  the  right  to  understand  what  data  are  being  generated  about  them,  how  these  are
compiled into information and the uses to which they are put (see Kitchin 2016). Moreover,
rewards from data ought to be socially shared or re-distributed both within the Public and
within communities of practice (see Mazzucato 2018). Other solutions in this respect have
included renewed calls for a form of ‘basic social income’ which acknowledges the smart city
as a ‘social  factory’,  but also considers labour as producer  of use value beyond  capitalist
forms of production and appropriation (e.g., Monnier and Vercellone 2017).
Partly acknowledging this, forms of democratisation of data and software are not  per se
immune of falling into the “post-political  trap of technological  determinism” (McLaren &
Agyeman, 2015, p. 201): there is a risk these initiatives foster ‘commons’ as a goal in itself,
rather than ‘commoning’ as the process that leads to such a goal. Hardt and Negri (2009) call
the new digital  commons as “immaterial”;  however, each commons presents a new set of
social  relations  and spatial  organisations.  Thus,  a  materialist  critique  of  digital  commons
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(information,  knowledge,  data,  software,  etc.)  ought  to  centre  on  daily  practices  of
inhabitation  and social  reproduction.  For Henry Lefebvre ([1967] 1996),  urban space is  a
“work of art” of its users:  it  is appropriated by the everyday practices  of the people who
inhabit it. In this guise, the right to the city is “a right to change ourselves by changing the city
more  after  our  heart’s  desire”  (Harvey  2003:1).  This  is  a  space  ready  to  accommodate
citizens’ political claims: according to Marcuse’s reading of Lefebvre (2009), this is the most
radical  idea  he  brings  forth  because  it  opens  both  to  those  people  deprived  of  material
subsistence and legal rights (a cry) and to alternative futures (and a demand). In other words,
pursuing the ‘right to the smart city’ means creating cities that are not rooted in and driven-by
technological capitalism and solutionism (see Cardullo, Kitchin, and Di Feliciantonio 2019).
As  a  consequence,  we  can  try  to  reframe  the  commons  from  the  classic  triad
Private/Public/Commons to the emerging configuration of Capitalism/City/Commons (see De
Angelis,  2017).  Here,  the  scale  of  reference  is  at  the  city  and infra-city  level,  while  the
struggle for appropriation of value moves iteratively through the two circuits for creation and
circulation of wealth and well-being: the circuit of capital and that of the commons. 
It  is  through  this  agonistic,  dynamic,  and  place-based  lens  that  I  understand  public
provision of the Internet. The paper starts advocating for a policy direction alternative to the
prevalent neoliberal mode of making cities ‘smart’: this would include municipalisation and
democratic  governance  of  critical  infrastructures  (including  ‘data  infrastructure’  and  the
Internet)  and  Public  Commons  Partnerships  between  the  city,  cooperatives,  and  social
movements. 
Maintaining the Internet as a commons 
In this section, I discuss maintenance of urban commons in the smart city by presenting very
briefly two case studies around ecologies of the Internet  provision and their  relation with
commoning.  These  draw on previous  ethnographic  research  on a  communitarian  wireless
network in inner-city London (Cardullo 2017), more recent interviews around citizen-focused
European smart city projects (Cardullo and Kitchin 2018b), and secondary sources from an
ongoing research on this matter (see Cardullo 2015; Cardullo and Roio forthcoming).  The
first case study concerns the provision of municipal extra-large broadband in Chattanooga,
Tennessee, and discusses public ownership of the Internet,  although with a critical  eye to
urban governance and the roles citizens have in its overall ecology. A public-led provision of
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the  Internet  as  envisioned  here,  in  fact,  would  not  work  without  different  degrees  of
involvement from users and communities of practice: there is plenty of intelligence in the
ethos and practices of community-led projects and in their informal uses of infrastructures,
which cities can harvest in order to become more technologically inclusive and competitive.
Thus, the second case revisits an ethnographic account I wrote around a community wireless
network  in  inner-city  London  called  OWN(Cardullo  2017),  reflecting  on  its  long-term
sustainability through commoning. 
Chattanooga, the ‘Gig City’
Although fast connectivity is crucial to the development of data capitalism, the backbone on
which networked technologies and people exchange data, is often assumed. As Mazzucato has
been suggesting for some time (e.g., Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013), the private sector and
the  dominant  neoliberal  discourse  downplay  massively  the  role  of  the  public  in  driving
innovation and growth via core infrastructures, investments in skills and literacy, and more
generally  in  taking  on  board  the  political-economic  risks  of  failure.  Similarly,  Hu
(2015:XVII)  reminds  that  “the  all-but-forgotten  infrastructures  that  undergird  the  cloud’s
physical origins [are] often originated in a state’s military apparatus”, where ‘the cloud’ is a
catchy  metaphor  for  the  Internet:  “a  cultural  fantasy,  always  more  than  its  present-day
technological manifestation” (p. 97). 
This is never been more true than for Chattanooga, Tennessee, which in 2010 was the first
city in the United States to offer 1 Gbps high-speed Internet (at the time, over 200 times faster
than the national average), thus transforming the image of a polluted and failing city into the
thriving ‘Gig City’ (Kitheka et al. 2016). More notably, this super-fast Internet was offered
via  the  municipal  and  non-profit  Electric  Power  Board,  making  it  the  largest  public
investment  in  the US on the matter  (EPB 2015).  This mid-sized Tennessee city  (170,000
people) made the headlines again in 2015 when it implemented the world's first community-
wide 10Gbps Internet  service.  This  is  particular  relevant  in the context  of the US, where
Internet  activists  have  long  complained  of  the  widening  digital  divide  caused  by  private
contractors dis-investment (the so-called ‘Big Cable’: private giant providers such as Comcast
and AT&T), which have left behind small and rural towns and impoverished neighbourhoods
(e.g., Gonzalez 2018).iv 
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The  Chattanooga  case  study  offers  interesting  points  for  the  debate  on  public
infrastructure, governance and commoning in the smart city. First, it dismantles a few myths:
that the public is always behind the technological curve, and thus needs private consultancy,
interventions  and  skills  (see  Kitchin,  Coletta,  Evans,  Heaphy,  &  MacDonncha,  2017;
Mazzucato, 2018); and that the public is slow, unreliable and inefficient in delivering – EPB
completed  its  ambitious  project  much earlier  than  planned using  a  federal  loan issued to
implement cables for its electric smart grid (Davidson and Santorelli 2015). Just to give a
sense of this town’s achievement, in September 2016 the European Commission adopted its
strategy on  connectivity, a European 'Gigabit Society', with the main strategic objective  to
give 1Gbps to all schools, transport hubs and main providers of public services and digitally
intensive enterprise by 2025: Chattanooga city realised this goal, at a much smaller scale, 25
years  earlier  and  did  it  with  public  investments  (that  is,  not  solely  to  overcome ‘market
failure’, but as a strategic and planned political decision).
Second, the case study highlights the relevance of the urban scale vis-a-vis county, state
and federal scales, whose legislations have hindered rather than facilitated it (e.g., positing
limits to EPB pricing policy and geographical expansion). In other words, the City inverted
the cycle of privatizations and market-led solutions, in a particularly hostile environment: Big
Cable and the Conservatives brought forward many legal challenges to Chattanooga City, and
even TV commercials warning against the perils of public investments (Rushe 2014), in order
to guarantee a ‘free market’. 
Third, the EPB fibre disrupts powerfully the Net Neutrality debate – that certain types of
data should be throttled (slowed down), connections metered or charged at different rates, and
certain sites blocked. At the present, these are hotly debated topics in the US (e.g., Gonzalez,
2018):  as  a  consequence  of  the  recent  repealing  of  neutrality  rules  by  the  Federal
Communications  Commission (FCC), the cities  of San Francisco,  Seattle,  and Boston are
promising municipal broadband as an alternative which seems to gain momentum, especially
among young voters.v 
Finally,  and  fourth,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  citizens  can  lobby  the  mid-sized  town
administrators more successfully than when acting as individual customers dealing with off-
shore call centres funded by Big Cable. Issues of governance, however, are case-specific and
need deeper ethnographic engagement to be fully evaluated. A degree of scepticism that super
fast Internet translates automatically into greater benefits for lay people is also due: if it takes
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“just  33 seconds to  download a  two-hour,  high-definition  film in Chattanooga”  (Koebler,
2016), then we might want to ask how many films, or similar content, an average family can
possibly  use  in  one  day?  As  an  indirect  evidence,  EPB  has  now  nearly  100k  Internet
customers (more than half of the civil and commercial residents of Chattanooga), which drops
to about 20% in its poorer neighbourhoods (Koebler, 2016): despite EPB offering half-price
subsidized  Internet  for  families  that  have  students  enrolled  in  school  lunch  programs,  it
appears that poorer residents prefer signing up with Comcast which offers a cheaper service
although much slower and capped. In other words, what is the real use value of super-sized
smart city initiatives like this? There is little doubt for me that Chattanooga has a typical
‘smart city’ strategy in mind: attraction of creative class via digital hubs, which bolster now
several tech incubators and attract new businesses, including venture capital funds (Rushe,
2014).  If  the  material  and  symbolic  effects  of  this  “Internet  boomtown”  (Koebler  2016)
appear solid on the local economy, these are also  assumed to ‘trickle down’ to the poor. More
longitudinal  research would be needed to evaluate  the impact  of ‘the Gig’ on the overall
population, a third of which is said to be at risk of poverty and social exclusion. 
It is important to note that other cities in the US have shown a different sensibility and
approach  to  the  issue  of  public  Internet  connectivity.  For  instance,  New  York  City  has
installed  a  Wi-Fi  network  through  the  largest  public  housing  complex  in  the  US,  its
Queensbridge which houses over 7,000 residents in 95 buildings. Although NYC does not
own the power company, as for the Chattanooga example, it managed to guarantee a free
25Mbps connection for all residents while offering premium rates for more demanding users.
Installation and maintenance of this large networks was given via procurement to a third party
company  which  managed  to  include  the  resident  associations  (at  least  with  regards  to
information and consent) and some local people too (as trainees for the basic maintenance of
the network) (Lewis-Kraus 2016). While Chattanooga remains a good example of efficient
public service delivery, but apparently with limited impact on marginalised population, New
York City  experiments  in  public  housing  shows how utilities  can  be  delivered  as  public
service  with  redistributive  effects,  and  even  foster  a  more  democratic  model  of  urban
governance. 
Democratic  governance  is  a  double-faced Janus which offers benefits  to both city  and
communities.  It  is  an  essential  element  for  commoning  practices,  which  would  involve
citizens  as equal  stakeholders  with rights and entitlements,  rather  than as consumers  of a
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private utility provision. But it is also necessary to the city in order to become part of the
communitarian practices of its inhabitants. As Stavrides (2016) writes, any commons is held
in a dialectic relationship with its users because “common space keeps on producing those
who produce it”. He goes further suggesting that an essential feature for the perpetration of
urban commons is the possibility of controlling and eventually revoking appointed leaders.
Thus, researching the exclusionary practices of governance is important for understanding
commoning, “the social process that creates and reproduces the commons” (De Angelis &
Stavrides, 2010). The move from the object to the action is crucial here because the emphasis
is now on practices and agencies,  from exchange value to use value,  and from short-term
returns to longer-term ‘soft’ outcomes. In the following case study around a community-led
wireless network, I draw on the idea that ‘commoning’ is the long term modus operandi of the
commons  (e.g.  De  Angelis,  2017)  and  suggest  this  presents  many  challenges  to  the
sustainability of technology-led grassroot initiatives. 
OWN: Informality and commoning
Open  Wireless  Network  started  in  2008  from  the  rooftops  of  an  iconic  hack-space  in
Deptford, inner-city London.vi It was a mesh of independent radios (nodes) which, by talking
to  each  others  and  via  ad-hoc  gateways,  provided  extended  broadband  access  to  the
immediate  neighbourhood or passers-by in  the reach of its  wireless  signal.  Soon after  its
establishment, OWN peaked to almost 100 nodes and over 400 users at any one time, but in
the last few years the project went through a period of decline since, with smartphone data
network access as standard and a wider public provision in libraries and cafés, “some of the
passion  for  independent  Wi-Fi  infrastructure  building  has  fallen  away”  (Cardullo,  2017).
Informality and commoning were key to the initial popularity of OWN. This is because OWN
resulted in a great value for its users, responding to the local population’s real need: a working
class and racially diverse neighbourhood where digital divide and the gentrification pressure
of displacement are high. The mesh of nodes particularly suited transient and migrant people,
students and temporary workers, but also less wealthy locals, who did not have the capability
to enrol in any official provision (for lack of residential documentation or money). 
Community Wireless Mesh Networks (CWMNs) have been under development since early
2000s thanks to the work of ethical hackers and activists responding to a series of local needs
and generally advocating a more open, neutral and democratic Internet  (Cardullo and Roio
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forthcoming;  Medosch 2003).  Because of their  inexpensive hardware and relative ease of
assemblage, community networks have been deployed in many different ways, operating as
specific  solutions  to  local  issues:  therefore,  each  case  is  related  to  its  wider  digital  and
political  ecosystem.  Primarily,  they have been an answer to  excessive connectivity  costs,
allowing communities to share the cost of network deployment and the use and provision of
resources, such as community radios, applications and data or listing of community events
(for  instance,  both Ninux in  Italy  and Freifunk in Germany started  in  2002 and grew to
operate about 40k node). Adoption of CWMNs seems to have regained traction, especially in
the  US,  because  of  the  current  Net  Neutrality  debate,  where  Big  Cable  ISPs  have  been
lobbying for selective throttling,  slowing down and metering,  particularly in the  Fibre-to-
Home market. Second, community networks have been providing ‘last mile’ access to remote
localities where the market has ‘failed’ to deliver: this is how Guifi.net started in Catalonia in
2004, now bolstering over 33k operating nodes in much part  of Spain.  Third, community
networks are  deployed to fight  data extractive  practices  and surveillance,  since mesh are,
ultimately,  Intranet  systems  with  locally  controlled  circulation  and  repositories  of  data.
Obviously,  dense  residential  areas  work  better  for  crowd-sourcing  since  they  can  enable
resource  pooling  and  commoning  across  the  network  (e.g.,  file-sharing,  game  modding,
environmental data). This is the case of SNet in Havana, a wide and expanding mesh where
about 20k users play networked games and exchange electronic items.vii In ‘Citizen Science’,
open-source hardware platforms like Arduino and Raspberry-Pi are deployed for low-cost and
scalable projects generally for environmental monitoring. Finally, the resilience of CWMNs
has been occasionally tested by natural or man-made disasters, for example when Hurricane
Sandy  destroyed  most  of  the  communication  infrastructure  in  NYC,  Red  Hook  mesh
functioned as an effective back-up in the area.viii 
My  research  on  the  development  of  Open  Wireless  Network  (2013-15)  revealed  that
maintaining a mesh of hardware,  patching the software,  and training people to use it  was
possible only with a large amount of stewardship from trusted community advocates who
themselves had strong technical skills (Cardullo, 2017). We can call them ‘ethical hackers’,
people able to mobilise a good degree of social and technical skills, voluntary work, and some
occasional funding. Indeed, the major challenge for community networks is  their long-term
operation and maintenance, especially when many lay practitioners are involved as the mesh
tends to scale horizontally and vertically (as geographical extension and number of users).
CWMNs have been experimenting with different models for sustainability and governance,
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the majority relying on voluntary work from activists and contributions from their members to
offer Internet connectivity (Cardullo and Roio forthcoming). Usually, node owners buy their
hardware:  radio,  antenna,  cables  (e.g.  Freifunk  in  Germany,  Ninux.org  in  Italy,  S-Net  in
Havana, OWN in London). Guifi.net in Spain, instead, has been asking members (including
commercial operators) to adopt a specific licence, subscribe to an arbitrator agreement and
contribute with a fee which includes upgrade and development of the network and also its
maintenance.  This  is  carried  by  senior  members,  professionals  who  also  offer  other
telecommunication services over the network (landline telephone or IT support),  thus said
guided by “clear ideas and strong leadership” (Baig et al. 2015). Finally, Red Hook mesh in
NYC offers a model where installation and maintenance are provided by Digital Stewards:
these are young residents from the local public housing employed in a paid fellowship (20
hours a week at $8.75 an hour), funded by a public grant(Cohen 2017).ix Whatever the model
adopted, every group involved in community networking maintains a local weekly or monthly
assembly for face-to-face discussion and problem-solving: for OWN, in London, this was a
free  training  space  called  ‘Wireless  Wednesday’.  This  is  because  making  community
operative is an endeavour rooted in social trust, which is a long-term relationship involving at
least  two things:  a  place easy to  recognise,  in  the locale  where people  actually  live,  and
projects  that  are  engaging  because  deemed  ‘useful’,  that  is,  they  are  perceived  of  doing
‘something’ for their users. 
There was another problem affecting the provision of OWN, as with many other public
hotspots. One of the hosts of the mesh recalls that, “because of the speed involved, OWN is
not good for videos, but it is for general browsing” (in Cardullo 2017). This reminds of the
Chattanooga case: speed, bandwidth and cables matter sometimes. Although the mechanism
of  governance  needs  to  be  evaluated  case  by  case,  it  is  tempting  to  suggest  the  coming
together  of  public  investments  in  critical  infrastructures  and  the  communitarian  ethos  of
sharing and caring (see De Angelis 2017; McLaren and Agyeman 2015; Morozov and Bria
2018;  Scholz  2016).  These  would  re-propose  the  role  of  the  public  as  a  competitive
stakeholder beyond the rhetoric of ‘market failure’ (Mazzucato’s argument for ‘public value’,
2018), while preserving ethos, autonomy and some degrees of informality proper of grass-root
organisations.  This paper suggests a mixed approach in the provision of the Internet which
may be able to satisfy few of the categories above – by way of including grass-root initiatives
(in the forms of co-operatives, citizen groups, and social enterprises such as small and ethical
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ISPs), public engagement from the city (as an organisation with social and political goals),
and an adequate level of public investments (not only in support of ‘market failure’).
Concluding remarks
Are  public  funds  available  to  cities  for  the  implementation  and maintenance  of  a  public
Internet service? And, is this a social priority? Indeed, in the prevalent neoliberal framework
public  investments  are admissible  only for supporting areas and communities  which have
fallen through the net of private providers’ profit and market imperatives of economic growth.
The public  strategy  for  broadband connectivity  can  be  summarised  in  the  catchphrase  of
‘market failure’, that is,  public investment should only take place “where the market  is not
providing the desired connectivity”.x Nowadays that the Internet of People and Internet of
Things have merged into the ‘Smart City’, access to a reliable and affordable Internet is not
just a matter of geographical inequalities, between the city and the rural or between areas of
the same city, and probably neither solely an issue of human rights. It is instead a matter of
basic participation to civic life, one gateway for the ‘right to the smart city’: whether we like
or  not,  digital  services  are  becoming the privileged  or  only way to pay taxes  or  parking
tickets, to apply for a job or complete school homework, to register a birth or vote: in other
words, the way in which people, especially in the Global North, inhabit cities everyday. 
For some, it is also a matter of taking the Internet (and, thus, data and the basic privacy
rights) back into control and away from the big players and the state. This is a motivation that
has traditionally  bolstered community networks but it  has become,  at  least  in the aims, a
policy to be followed by a growing number of cities. From the Fibre-to-Home service to the
remote  data  farms,  technology presents  itself  as  a  composite  assemblage  where  issues  of
social justice and democratic governance are to be addressed at each step. Perhaps, not any
one  city  can  control  the  overall  process  and  gain  complete  “technological  and  digital
sovereignty”  (Bria  2017).  However,  some cities  are  moving towards the goal  of  a  more
favourable access to the Internet, like New York; others have taken further steps by fostering
data commons, like Barcelona or Amsterdam. These and other cities have joined together in
the ‘Cities Coalition for Digital Rights’ which aims to show a different path of being ‘smart’
by supporting practices for preserving citizens’ digital rights.xi Morozov and Bria  (2018:23)
classify  these  cities  into: “those  offering  an  alternative  regime  for  dealing  with  citizen-
produced data; those promoting an alternative, more cooperative model of service provision;
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those seeking to control the activities of platforms like Airbnb or Uber; and those promoting
and building alternative infrastructures to compete with Silicon Valley”. 
In my view, however, discourses around data and digital commons risk to foster a certain
determinism, sometimes focusing more on the object (e.g., a certain data-set or software being
made  available  as  common  good)  rather  than  the  process  that  leads  to  and  maintains  it
(commoning).  Internet equality claims do not stand as an exception since more connected
people do not translate automatically into fairer communities, nor more liveable cities. This is
because  cities  are  messy  and  complex  places  and  because  infrastructures  are  socio-
technological  assemblages  that  depend  for  their  functioning  on  the  practices,  uses,  and
therefore  skills  of  those  involved  around  the  milieu  they  foster.  With  algorithm-led
technologies, this assumption is often subsumed to the process of acquiring data, selecting
optimal profiles and responses, and enabling feedback. Thus, there is room for a conclusive
cautionary note around the the implementation and maintenance of a public network, with two
issues in relation to community involvement and commoning in the ‘smart city’. 
The first one concerns the substantial differences between algorithm trust and social trust:
people  and  things  are  actuators  of  the  data  exchange  through  networks,  continuously
performing acts of ‘trust’ at the margin of the mesh. But while algorithm trust happens in
milliseconds between long alphanumeric keys which recognise each others and perform a so-
called ‘handshake’, social trust hinges on long term relationships and slow exchanges often
performed face to face in the spaces of daily inhabitation and around social spaces shared in
commons.  Here,  there is  room for  ethical  hackers  and community  organisers  with strong
technical skills to mobilize knowledge transfer and try to limit digital divides, and for people
to get actively involved in the making or maintenance of technologies in social space. But
smart city innovations risk to foster exclusionary outcomes, because city space itself – the
spaces of social reproduction and production of the commons – is increasingly divided by
‘rent’, which displaces both communitarian hacktivists and local residents (Cardullo 2017).  
Moreover, and second issue, we can draw a vector of possibilities along the determinants
of stewardship and socio-technical skills,  both needed to maintain smart technologies as a
working infrastructure. Provision of the Internet for people and ‘things’ require medium level
stewardship and skills; however, stewardship becomes essential with regard to communitarian
networks  because  the  higher  the  involvement  of  lay  people  the  harder  it  will  become to
include  them in  the  development  and  deployment  of  the  technology.  Smart  technologies
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demand often the deployment of cultural and social capitals, because they are linked to social
exchange and their implementation is conditional to contextual arrangements in communities
of interest and localities: that is, there is nothing automatic and deterministic about platforms
and sensors in making communities ‘operative’. Moreover, some of the technologies currently
deployed in the smart city are beyond people’s agentive interaction with their computational
processes enabling black-boxed, autonomous and automated responses. 
Rather than an heroic immersion in the back alleys of cybernetics (which would focus on
protocol exchange, encryption, blockchain, and other technical solutions), the paper suggests
a  pragmatic  approach  to  commons  in  the  smart  city.  This  approach  would  consider,  for
instance,  that the myriad of citizen-science and crowdsourced projects  and communitarian
networks suffer from conspicuous stewardship and long term maintenance,  resources,  and
scalability issues, which maybe cities can support by taking the backbone under their own
capacity and favouring municipalised or cooperative enterprises, such as small and ethical
ISPs. Conversely, there is an uncertain role of the city in drawing policies that support (or
hinder) the inclusion of communities, devolve (or take) power to (from) citizens, and enact (or
re-centralise) forms of open and democratic governance. This is because there is more public
and  political  awareness  around  the  data  extractive  practices  of  digital  capitalism,  the
surveillance  capabilities  of  commercial  and state  players,  and the  monopolistic  regime in
which Internet Service Providers (ISPs) operate. 
The paper plots this trajectory showing that cities have a lot to learn and gain from the
commons: citizens  might  even be able to shift  their  role of ‘consumers’ and regain some
accountability, privacy and, eventually, control over technologies (e.g., Cardullo and Kitchin
2018a).  As McLaren and Agyeman suggest (2015:1), “good governance and collective city
structures” are what successful cities need. Here, of course, the key words are ‘good’ and
‘collective’,  which require a more articulate response than this paper can offer. These are
ethical and political  questions: in what forms these modalities are combined is difficult  to
forecast and should be evaluated case by case. The paper contends though that an alliance
between  city  and  the  commons,  rather  than  the  market,  can  start  removing  some of  the




The  research  for  this  paper  was  provided  by  a  European  Research  Council  Advanced
Investigator  Award,  ‘The Programmable  City’  (ERC-2012-AdG-323636).  Many thanks  to
Rob Kitchin and Cesare di Feliciantonio for their editing suggestions and comments, and to
the attendees  of  the ‘After  the smart  city?  The state  of  critical  scholarship  ten years  on’
sessions at the Association of American Geographers meeting in New Orleans, April 2018,
for their useful comments. A shorter version of this paper will appear in Kitchin, R., Cardullo,
P., and Di Feliciantonio, C., eds., 2019. The Right to the Smart City. Emerald Publishing.
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i    https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/broadband-big-pipes-potential-growth  
ii For instance, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/blog/objective-2017-more-investments-digital;
see also: https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/fcc-broadband-initiative-could-reduce-
barriers-to-low-income
iii  https://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyre-using-the-internet/  
iv A handful of towns are following now on the example offered by Chattanooga, for instance Hopkinsville, 
Kentucky, https://hop-electric.com/news/introducing-the-new-energynet/
v   https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/technology/net-neutrality-repeal.html  
vi Recently closed after H&S and Fire regulation checks by Greenwich Council, 
http://wrd.spc.org/described/deckspace/
vii Snet is not offering a gateway to the public Internet since connectivity in Cuba is patchy and limited to public 
parks and schools because of the US embargo and restrictive local policies. 
viiiHowever, since CWMNs operate in unlicensed frequency bands which are subject to uncontrolled interference 
from a range of sources and overcrowding, their efficacy during emergency is disputed. 
ix  https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/nyregion/red-hooks-cutting-edge-wireless-network.html  
x   https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/state-aid  
xi  https://citiesfordigitalrights.org/actions.html  
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